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THE MISREPRESENTATION PROBLEM:




Had Congress enacted the Ninth Commandment verbatim, its
latitude would surpass the present version of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
only slightly. The statute, a modern-day version of the an-
cient Biblical injunction proscribing false witness, has been lim-
ited by Congress to matters in which the federal government
has some direct and immediate interest. The language of the
statute reads as follows:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States, know-
ing and wilfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representa-
tions or makes or uses any false writing, or document,
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statments or entry, shall be fined not more
than $10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.'
A brief history of the statute is found in United States v.
Stark,2 in which Judge Chestnut reported it was enacted over
one hundred years ago as the result of a congressional reaction
to a spate of frauds upon the Government. The original lan-
guage of the statute applied only to persons in the military
service of the United States and prohibited them from present-
ing false claims to the Government for payment. Also prohibit-
ed in the same statute was the making of any false statement in
documents supporting the false claim. At this point in the
development of the statute, only false monetary claims were
within the scope of the law. Until 1934, the law remained sub-
* B.A., Wofford College; L.L.B., University of South Carolina; L.L.M.,
Georgetown University; Associate, McKay, McKay, Black, Sherrill, Walker
& Wilkins, Columbia, S. C.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
2. 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
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stantially unchanged, although previously it had been amended
to prohibit false statements made "for the purpose and with the
intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Govern-
ment."8 The statute was amended in 1934 to include language
which clearly marks the creation of a different type of offense,
that. of the false statement per se. The 1934 version contained
the following language:
[O]r whoever shall knowingly and wilfully falsify or
conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or
fraudulent statements or representations, or make or
use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt,
voucher, roll, account claim, certificate, affidavit, or
deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent
or fictitious statement or entry, in any manner within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States or of any corporation in which the
United States of America is a stockholder.
4
In United States v. Crilliland,5 the United States Supreme Court
commented on the 1934 amendment:
The Amendment eliminated the words "cheating and
swindling" and broadened the provision so as to leave
no adequate basis for the limited construction which
previously obtained . . . . In this, there was no re-
striction to cases involving pecuniary or property loss
to the government.
6
The most recent amendment to the statute occurred in 1948 and
resulted in a separation of monetary and non-monetary fraud
offenses into different statutory sections. The non-monetary
fraud section is now 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Use of the term "non-monetary fraud" herein should not be
taken to mean that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not apply to false
statements in connection with false claims, because, as will be
more fully discussed, the statute clearly applies in those in-
stances in which a false statement is made to a Government
agency. The term is merely intended to mean that a monetary
fraud is not necessary to complete the offense.
3. Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015.
4. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996.
5. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
6. Id. at 93.
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B. Purpose of the Statute
In Gilliland, the United States Supreme Court, commenting
on the 1934 amendment, defined its purpose as follows:
The amendment indicated the congressional intent to
protect the authorized functions of governmental de-
partments and agencies from the perversion which
might result from the deceptive practices described.
7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 as servicing
the vital public purpose of protecting governmental
functions from frustration and distortion through
deceptive practices, and it must not be construed as if
its object were narrow and technical."
A slightly different function was assigned in United States v.
Myers,9 in which a federal district court believed that the
statute was designed
to insure the whole world, governmental employees and
the general public alike, that any record, document, in-
strument or statement made by a governmental em-
ployee, great or small, in his official capacity, and in
the course of his official duties, can be relied upon
by all.10
C. Scope of the Statute
Analysis of the statutory language reveals that three acts are
prohibited. These acts are concealment of a material fact, false
oral statements, and false written statements. The latter two
acts, in reality, constitute the same basic offense. While the
objective of false representation and concealment, moreover, are
similar,
to create or foster on the part of a Government agency,
a misapprehension of a true state of affairs, the ele-
ments of proof differ. False representations, like
common-law perjury, require proof of actual falsity;
concealment requires proof of wilful non-disclosure by
means of a trick, scheme or device."
7. Id.
8. Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742 (9th Cir. 1962).
9. 131 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
10. Id. at 531.
11. United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1963).
1969]
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Of the two offenses described above, this paper will deal pri-
marily with the offense of false representation, since most of
the cases have developed in that area.
That the statute reaches persons in all walks of life be-
comes evident upon a reading of the cases. Persons applying
for janitorial positions12 as well as members of Congress'3 have
been convicted under it. Nor is the statute limited to represen-
tations made to the executive branch of the Government; it
applies equally to the legislative and judicial branches as well.14
Additionally, the statute is applicable so long as the Govern-
ment has "colorable authority" to do what it is doing; and the
fact that the law under which it is operating is later held to
be unconstitutional is not a defense to a prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1001.15 Even advice to private individuals as to the
most effective method of presenting false documents to a gov-
ernment agency has been held punishable because "[the statute
is broad enough to reach the brains behind a scheme, as well
as the mere instrument of its execution." 16
II. ELEDMNTs OF THE OrrmE sE
The elements of the offense of false representations have
been stated to be as follows:
(1) a statement
(2) falsity
(3) that the statement be made "knowingly and wil-
fully" and
(4) that the false statement be made in a "matter




(1) Written or Oral
Clearly, it makes no difference whether the false statement
takes written or oral form, since the statute proscribes both.
(2) Materiality
12. Alire v. United States, 313 F.2d 31 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 943 (1963).
13. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
14. Id.
15. United States v. Meyer, 140 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1944).
16. United States v. Goldsmith, 108 F.2d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1940).
17. United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370
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A more difficult distinction is whether or not the false state-
ment must relate to a material fact. There seems to be no ques-
tion that a conceaTment must be material, because materiality
is expressly required by the statute. As to false representations,
however, "the word 'material' modifying the word 'fact' would
seem not to be grammatically applicable to the second or third
categories."'
The rationale for this construction of the statutory language
has been stated as follows:
Obviously it endangers the public to give a govern-
mental agency false information to act on, even if this
information is as to an apparently immaterial detail,
since this detail may perchance influence the action of
the agency in fact. On the other hand, the mere fact
that an immaterial detail is withheld from such agency
cannot endanger the public. Such is the clear rationale
of the very words in the statute which the Congress
used to express its intent.19
Another court has held that the false representation need not
be material:
We suggest that it is of doubtful wisdom, not to say
potentially dangerous, to import conditions into a penal
statute which appear to have been studiously omitted
by the lawmakers themselves . . . An attempt to con-
ceal or cover up may properly be limited only to facts
which are important and material. On the other hand,
a fact deliberately or wilfully mistated in a matter of
appropriate governmental inquiry seems properly pun-
ishable even if it is only a gratuitous red herring. As
such, of course, it can obstruct, delay, or deflect an in-
quiry which is pressing home to uncover fraud upon
the Government.
20
Following this decision, the Second Circuit has consistently
held that materiality is not required.2 1 Other courts have taken
a different view.
18. United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 198 (D. Md. 1955).
19. United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D.N.J. 1957).
20. United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375, 377 (2d Cir. 1956).
21. United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1965) ; United States
v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962).
1969]
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We think, however, that this highly penal statute must
be construed as requiring a material falsification. The
legislative purpose strongly implies that only material
false statements were contemplated, i.e., statements that
could affect or influence the exercise of a governmental
function . . .. No perversion of a governmental func-
tion could possibly result from a false statement that
was incapable of affecting or influencing such func-
tion. And the greater weight of authority in the
federal courts supports the view that materiality is an
essential element of the offense described by § 1001.22
In the view of the Tenth,23 Ninth,24 Fifth,25 and Fourth"
Circuits, materiality is also required. This requirement, there-
fore, may be the majority rule.
The Eighth Circuit has determined that materiality is re-
quired, but has applied this test:
In determining whether a false statement is material,
the test is whether it 'has a natural tendency to in-
fluence, or was capable of influencing the decision of
the tribunal in making a determination required to be
made.' 27
A similar definition of materiality is found in other cases. 28
As a practical matter, as stated in United States v. Silver,29
"[a] lie in a matter within [the] jurisdiction will rarely, if ever,




(3) The Exculpatory "No"
In 1953 a federal district court in Colorado was faced with
the problem of determining whether or not an individual who
had made a false denial to an FBI agent was punishable under
22. Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598, 601-02 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
23. Gonzalez v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1960).
24. Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959).
25. Rolland v. United States, 200 F2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
964 (1953).
26. United States v. Zambito, 315 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
924 (1963).
27. Blake v. United States, 323 F2d 245, 246 (8th Cir. 1963), aff'g 206
F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
28. See Weinstock v. United States, 231 F2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
29. 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1956).
30. Id. at 378.
[Vol. 21
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18 U.S.C. § 1001.3' Posing the question in terms of intentionally
failing to tell the truth, the court reviewed the statutory his-
tory and concluded, based on Gi iland:
There was no indication that this construction would
be extended to include false oral statements . . . made
to an investigator or . . . any other person represent-
ing a department or agency of the United States in a
matter within the jurisdiction of the department or
agency.82
The court in United iStates v. Stark," faced with similar
facts, reached a similar conclusion and questioned whether a
bare, negative, false denial could be given the dignity of the
title "statement." The real question was "not merely whether
they were 'statements' within the broad dictionary sense of the
term, but rather, were they statements within the intent of
Congress. . . ."34 The court continued:
[T]he problem here is not to be determined by the mere
physical form of the statement, but rather by its in-
trinsic nature and purpose. Running through the
whole Act there seems to be discussed the congressional
purpose to ... protect governmental agencies from
perversion of their normal functioning. The purpose
seems to be to protect the government from the affir-
mative or aggressive and voluntary actions of persons
who take the initiative, or, in other words, to protect
the government from being the victim of some posi-
tive statement, whether written or oral, which has the
tendency and effect of perverting its normal activities.3 5
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Acvue,86 recognized
the "exculpatory no" but held that it did not apply to the facts
before it, where the accused had voluntarily furnished to the
Government a large amount of false information. In United
States v. Citron," following the Moque case, a federal district
court in New York commented:
31. United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
32. Id. at 89.
33. 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
34. Id. at 204-05.
35. Id. at 205.
36. 301 F2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. 221 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
19691
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The Court of Appeals of this Circuit has suggested that
such a rule upon appropriate facts might have applica-
tion, albeit a narrow one, in excluding from Section
1001 "[t]he case of the citizen who replies to the police-
man with an exculpatory 'no'." . . . This potential
exception is based on the history of Section 1001 as a
statute seeking to prevent the administration of Gov-
ernment programs from being subverted or frustrated
by the false representations . . . although the line be-
tween "administration" and "investigation" cannot al-
ways be sharply drawn, it is arguable that the statute
was not intended to require, in every conceivable
situation . . . a citizen to answer truthfully questions
put to him in the course of police or other criminal
investigations.33
Other cases have recognized and upheld the "exculpatory no."39
Perhaps the most valid observations concerning the "exculpa-
tory no" are those which identify the facts under which it
does not exist. The "exculpatory no" by general agreement
probably does not exist in matters which are purely adminis-
trative and not investigative. It probably does not exist in
investigative matters in which the initiative for the false state-
ment came from the accused.40 Finally, it is doubtful if it exists
where the false statement is much more than a bare negative
response to inquiries by government agencies. In brief summary,
the exculpatory denial is a small, unreliable exception to a
broad statute.
B. Falsity
There seems to be general agreement on the meaning of
"false, fictitious and fraudulent" and very little has been said
regarding this element of the offense. One case has indicated
that the falsity contemplated by the statute has reference to
the substance of the statement and not to its form. In Trav'is
v. United States,41 a union official was prosecuted under 18
38. Id. at 455.
39. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; United States v. Davey,
155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
40. United States v. Citron, 221 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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U.S.C. § 1001 for falsely stating that he was not a member of
the Communist Party. He had resigned from the Party prior
to making the statement, but the evidence indicated that his
resignation was for the purpose of making the statement, and
he had actively participated in party functions after his "resig-
nation." Under these facts the court held that the resignation
was not a defense.
C. Knowingly and TViZfully
The issue which frequently arises regarding the element
"knowingly and wilfully" concerns primarily the definition of
"wilfulness." The cases are somewhat divided 2 as to whether
or not wilful means "with evil intent" or simply "with knowl-
edge." In HirscA v. Immigation c& Naturalization Service,43
the Ninth Circuit decided that the Government need not prove
that the defendant in fact had an evil intent. The word
wilful means no more than that the forbidden act is
done deliberately and with knowledge.44
Also, in McClanahan v. United States,"5 the accused com-
plained that his motive could not have been evil since he had
acted on the advice of counsel. His argument was rejected
because "[t]he word 'wilful' means no more than . . . a for-
bidden act . . . done deliberately and with knowledge....
The advice of counsel would not justify . . . the wrongdoing
condemned by the statutes."4 6
The Supreme Court has defined "wilful" in a different
manner, although the offense which it was considering was a
misdemeanor rather than a felony. In that case, United States
v. Murdock, 47 "wilful" was defined thusly:
The word often denotes an act which is intentional or
knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from acciden-
tal. But, when used in a criminal statute, it generally
means an act done with a bad purpose ... without
justifiable excuse ... stubbornly, obstinately, per-
versely .... The word is also employed to character-
42. H. BAI.TE, TAx FRAUD AND EVASION pt. 11, at 9 (3d ed. 1963).
43. 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962).
44. Id. at 567.
45. 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1956).
46. Id. at 924.
47. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
1969]
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ize a thing done without ground for believing it is
lawful ... or conduct marked by careless disregard
whether or not one has the right to so act .... 48
As support for the Murdocok decision, in connection with the
interpretation of the word "wilful", it should be noted that the
statute uses not only the word "wilfully", but also the word
"knowingly." If the word "wilful" has any function at all
in the statute, it must mean something more than or different
from "knowingly."
One writer has commented, however, that "it is doubtful
whether a jury would be deterred from convicting, all other
elements being present, solely on the basis of a broader or
narrower instruction on wilfulness." 49
D. "A Matter Within the Jurisdiction"
Whether or not a matter is within the jurisdiction involves
at least two essential questions. The first question is whether
or not the agency has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
second question assumes jurisdiction exists, but examines
whether or not the false statement is "within" that jurisdic-
tion. It is essential to a conviction that the agency have
jurisdiction, and that the false statement be within that
jurisdiction.
(1) Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter
Some courts, in attempting to support the "exculpatory no"
have asserted that a false "no" to an investigator does not
pervert the function of the investigator which is to investigate.50
In United States v. Davey,"5' in which a false "no" was given
by the defendant to an F.B.I. agent, the court refused to allow
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, asking:
Is it the authorized function of the Bureau to extract
from the suspect only the truth, or, in view of the
Fifth Amendment proscribing compulsory self-incrim-
ination, to hear and record only such statement as the
accused desires freely and voluntarily to make?52
48. Id. at 394-95.
49. H. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EvAsioN pt. 11, at 9 (3d ed. 1963).
50. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Stark,
131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
51. 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
52. Id. at 178.
[Vol. 21
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Similarly, in United States v. Philippe,58 also dealing with
the "exculpatory no" to an investigator, conviction was not
allowed because the court felt that no perversion of function
occurred:
While the Special Agent may have been disappointed
that the defendant would not truthfully answer himself
into a felony conviction, we fail to see that his investi-
gative function was in any way perverted. The only
possible effect of exculpatory denials however false, re-
ceived from a suspect such as the defendant is to stim-
ulate the agent to carry out his function."4
All of the above cases dealt with the fact situation of "the
citizen who replies to the policeman with an exculpatory 'no'. 5
A different factual situation arose in the case of Friedman
v. United States,56 however, in which the defendant had been
arrested by state authorities and upon his subsequent release,
went to the F.B.I. and charged a state policeman with assault.
Prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the defendant was convicted
upon the jury's determination that his charge of assault was
false. The Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction upon the
rationale that the F.B.I. did not have the jurisdiction contem-
plated by 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Relying upon Davey, Stark, and
Paternostro, the court held:
In discussing jurisdiction, we must recognize the fun-
damental difference between the naked authority of a
body to act and the power to make final and binding
determinations. On one hand there exists a power to
make monetary awards, grant governmental privileges,
or promulgate binding administrative and regulative
determinations. From this jurisdiction indicating a
positive power, we must differentiate the mere author-
ity to conduct an investigation in a given area without
the power to dispose of the problems or compel action.
The F.B.I. had authority to investigate, and in that
broad sense it had 'jurisdiction.' However, it had no
53. 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
54. Id. at 584.
55. United States v. Citron, 221 F. Supp. 454, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
56. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
1969]
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power to adjudicate rights, establish binding regula-
tions, compel the action or finally dispose of the prob-
lem giving rise to the inquiry. In this restrictive
sense, the investigation of a possible violation of the
criminal law is not a matter over which the F.B.I.
exercises 'jurisdiction.' It is in this more restrictive
sense, we believe Congress intended to use the word
'jurisdiction' in determining violations of § 1001.57
In a lengthy and well reasoned dissent, Judge Register pointed
out that the cases on which the majority relied to find that the
F.B.I. had no "jurisdiction" were predicated on the question of
whether or not the "exculpatory no" was a "statement" within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Judge Register commented
further that the majority opinion would exclude all statements
made in criminal matters since only a court has the necessary
jurisdiction to act under the majority's definition of jurisdic-
tion. Judge Register concluded:
I see no sound reason in principle, based on public
policy or otherwise, why the statute should be construed
as being applicable to 'statements' made to investigative
officers of agencies or departments which have the
power to 'finally dispose' of the matter in inquiry, but
not applicable to statements of like character made to
investigative officers of the F.B.I. or of any other
agency . . . which does not have such power ....
The fact is, false statements made in matters
peculiarly within the 'investigative jurisdiction' and
authorized governmental function of the Department
of Justice may be exceedingly vicious and potentially
dangerous and harmful to others . . . . Any such state-
ments would necessarily initiate expensive and time-
consuming proceedings by government agents and the
substantial exercise by them of their authorized offi-
cial functions-matters of much more public concern, in
my opinion, than a relatively innocuous false civil
claim for monetary benefit or personal privilege.
5 8
Subsequently, the Second Circuit in United States v. Adler,59
briefly reviewed FIedman but refused to follow its reasoning,
57. Id. at 367-68.
58. Id. at 376-77 (dissenting opinion).
59. 380 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 21
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believing it not to be in accordance with the statutory purpose.
The court said: "In only the so-called 'exculpatory no' cases
have the Courts shown a reluctance to extend § 1001 'to cover
the investigation of criminal conduct'.7 60
(2) "Within The Jurisdiction"
The question here is when does the false statement come
"within" the jurisdiction. It is obvious that the making of a
false statement alone does not complete the offense. The cir-
cumstances in which the false statement is made, however, are
crucial. It is clear that if a person makes the false statement
directly to a government employee in the course of his official
duties, the statute applies. It is where the false statement takes
a more circuitous route, however, that the question whether or
not the false statement was made "within" the jurisdiction of
a department or agency of the United States is raised. In the
case of Lowe v. United States,6 1 the defendant was the employee
of a company which was performing a defense contract with the
United States, pursuant to which the Government reimbursed
the company for its payroll expenses. The defendant falsified
the number of hours he worked to his company and was sub-
sequently prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The court con-
cluded:
[T]he validity of the indictment depends upon whether
the alleged fact that the United States reimbursed the
company for its payroll payments was sufficient to
make the alleged misrepresentation with respect to the
payroll entry a matter within the jurisdiction of a de-
partment or agency of the United States ....
Accepting the allegations of the indictment as true,
appellant's employment was derived from his private
contract with a private corporation. His hours of work
and rate of pay, and the control and supervision over
the duties he performed, were matters within the ex-
clusive dominion of its private employer. The misrep-
resentation as to hours worked was made to an employee
of the private corporation under an arrangement
whereby the wages were to be paid by the corpora-
tion. Insofar as the employee was concerned, every
60. Id. at 922. See also Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.
1955) ; United States v. Van Valkenburg, 157 F. Supp. 599 (D. Alas. 1958).
61. 141 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1944).
1969]
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aspect of his employment was exactly the same as it
would have been had there been no contract with any
governmental agency of any kind . . . The contract
. . . at least so far as the record shows, did not desig-
nate the payroll department of the company as an
agency of the United States.
2
In Terry v. United States63 the defendant falsely told a lender
that he possessed collateral for a loan. The misrepresentations
were made upon applications printed by the FHA which con-
tained a warning that misrepresentations were violations of
federal law. The lender, although not FHA approved, at times
sold its loans to an FHA approved institution. Prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and convicted, the defendant appealed
and the conviction was reversed on the ground that the misrep-
resentation was not a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal
agency at the time that the misrepresentations were made. The
court was impressed by the fact that there was no guarantee
that the particular loan in question would be sold to the FHA
insured institution. The fact that the loan was in fact sold
and thus insured by FHA was not considered important by the
court because, "[a]n act which is not criminal at the time of its
commission may not be converted into a crime at a subsequent
time by the independent action of other persons." 64 It is clear
that in both of the cases discussed above, the court felt that the
false statement was sufficiently insulated from governmental
jurisdiction to prohibit the application of the statute.
In other cases the insulation has not been sufficient. United
States v. Giarraputo€6 dealt with a contractor producing classi-
fied weapons for the Department of the Navy. Employees of
the contractor were required to fill out a "Defense Personnel
Security Questionnaire" which was forwarded to the Navy
Department. The defendant, an employee of the contractor,
made a false statement on the questionnaire and was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The defendant complained that the
false statement was made to his employer and not to an agency
or department of the government, and therefore the falsity was
not a "matter within the jurisdiction." The court rejected this
62. Id. at 1006.
63. 131 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1942).
64. Id.
65. 140 F. Supp. 831 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
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argument, reasoning that the false statement need not be
directly presented to the government agency. The case differed
from the Terry case in that the questionnaire was certain to be
presented to the government. It differed from the Lowe case in
that the questionnaire was clearly a government questionnaire;
it referred to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and warned of the consequences
of a false statement, and the defendant knew that the ques-
tionnaire would be eventually forwarded to a government
agency.
In Ebeling v. United States6 6 a sub-contractor falsely claimed
non-existent costs against a prime contractor dealing with the
Government on a contract. The sub-contractor's defense was that
the papers were not furnished to the Government but only to
the prime contractor. The court held, however, that the statute
contemplated the use of a false statement "in intended rela-
tionship" to a matter within the jurisdiction of a governmental
agency and that the direct presentation to the Government of
a false statement was not necessary. The case was distinguish-
ed from Lowe on the basis that the employee in Lowe did not
make his false claim "in intended relationship" to govern-
mental matters. Lowe was not aware that his false statement
would be used in a matter within the jurisdiction of the gov-
ernment. Such was not the case, however, in Giarraputo and
Ebeling.
It is clear from the preceeding cases that for the false state-
ment to come "within" the jurisdiction, it must be used "in
intended relationship" to a governmental matter, and there
must be some certainty that the false statement will eventually
be received by a government department or agency.
E. Agency or Department of the United States
The term agency or department of the United States as used
in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 has also been the subject of judicial inter-
pretation. 18 U.S.C. § 6 defines department and agency thusly:
As used in this Title:
The term "department" means one of the executive
departments enumerated in Section 1 of Title 5, unless
the context shows that such term was intended to
describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches
of government.
66. 248 F2d 429 (8th Cir. 1957).
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The term "agency" includes any department, inde-
pendent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau of the United States or any
corporation in which the United States has a proprie-
tary interest, unless the context shows that such term
was intended to be used in a more limited sense.
8 7
In United States v. BrambWett,18 the United States Supreme
Court held that the context of the statute indicated a broader
application:
The context in which this language is used calls for an
unrestricted interpretation. This is enforced by its
legislative history. It would do violence to the pur-
pose of Congress to limit the section to falsifications
made to the executive departments. Congress could not
have intended to leave frauds such as this without pen-
alty. The development, scope and purpose of the section
shows that "department" as used in this context was
meant to describe the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the Government. 9
Courts have determined that other organizations are agencies
of the Government, as for example, an army post exchange,
70
an exclusion board in a military area established by executive
order,7 1 the Commodity Credit Corporation, and the United
States Tax Court.78 These are but a few of the varied organiza-
tions held to be government agencies or departments.
III. NoN-EL=ETs OF THm OnzwsEE
A. Peouniary Fraud
As stated previously, early versions of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 were
specifically directed against pecuniary fraud. However, the
Supreme Court has clearly held the statute is not restricted to
cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the Government.74
The Friedman case, if followed by other circuits, may herald
67. 18 U.S.C. § 6 (1964).
68. 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
69. Id. at 508.
70. United States v. Brethauer, 214 F. Supp. (W.D. Mo. 1963).
71. United States v. Meyer, 140 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1944).
72. Spivey v. United States, 109 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1940).
73. Stein v. United States, 363 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1966).
74. United States v. Gililand, 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
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an interesting trend in the development of the statute. Al-
though the Eighth Circuit in Friedman makes no attempt to
limit the statute to pecuniary fraud, it does appear to limit the
statute to those cases in which something is being sought from
the Government. Thus a new element, specifically the intent
to use a false statement for some gain or advantage, not neces-
sarily pecuniary, may be coming into the picture. If so, it
would seem to be at odds with the broad statements of the
statutory purpose quoted earlier herein. At present, it is doubt-
ful that the Friedman decision is in accord with the meaning
and purpose of the statute as interpreted by most of the
decisions.
B. Reliance of the Agency or Department upon the
False Statement
In common law fraud, reliance upon a false statement is a
necessary element of the offense. Defendants prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 have argued, generally unsuccessfully, that
the Government must have relied upon the false statement before
the offense is complete. This argument was expressly rejected
in Blake v. United ,States,75 in which the court said:
Consideration must be given to the fact that the nega-
tive answer did not induce the government to grant the
application; in other words, there was no reliance upon
the negative answer of the defendant. This fact does
not exempt the conduct of the defendant from the
operation of Section 1001. It seems well established in
federal criminal jurisprudence that actual influence of
the department or agency involved is not essential to
a prosecution under Section 1001.
6
In BRrandow v. United States, 7 7 the court held that the punish-
able conduct was the willful submission of false statements
calculated to induce agency reliance or action irrespective of
whether actual favorable action was, for other reasons, impos-
sible. Numerous other cases78 have reached similar conclusions
and the law in this area appears to be well settled.
75. 206 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1963).
76. Id. at 708.
77. 268 F2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959).
78. E.g., United States v. Coastal Contracting & Eng'r Co., 174 F. Supp.
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C. Statements Required by Law
In the case of Cohen v. United States,7 9 the defendant was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for voluntarily furnishing
false information to the Internal Revenue Service. Based on
the facts of Gilliland, which involved a statement required by
law, the defendant in Cohen complained that the statute was
only applicable to statements which the law required. The
court rejected this argument.
We do not agree. Although the particular false state-
ments in issue in United States v. Gilliland . . . were
contained in reports and affidavits which were required
to be made, the Supreme Court did not indicate that
this was an essential condition to the applicability of
[18 U.S.C. § 1001].80
Similarly, in Neely v. United Btates,81 the court held that
"statements of which there can be convictions under Section 1001
are not limited to those required to be made by law or regula-
tion." The foregoing appears to be the law despite some early
language to the contrary.
82
D. Statements Under Oath
Some defendants have tried to argue that the statute only
applies to statements that were made under oath. This interpre-
tation has not been accepted by the courts. In Neely the court
specifically rejected the argument citing the language of
Marzani v. United States,83 as follows:
The pertinent statute does not limit the offense to
formal statements, to written statements, or to state-
ments under oath. It applies to 'any false or fraudu-
lent statements or representations . . . in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States. 4
Again, the Friedman case, takes a contrary view which may be
merely dictum.
79. 201 F2d 386 (9th Cir. 1953).
80. Id. at 391.
81. 300 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
82. See United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
83. 168 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
84. 300 F.2d at 70.
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E. The Two-litness Rule.
In attempting to avoid conviction, many defendants have at-
tempted to incorporate into the offense elements from similar
statutes. Thus, the two-witness rule of the perjury statute has
often been asserted to be a part of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In Neely
the court refused to accept the argument and adhered to num-
erous prior decisions 85 which were cited therein. These decisions
indicate no difference of opinion as to the inapplicability of
the two-witness rule.
F. Submitting the False Statement to the Government
The question of whether or not the statement must be sub-
mitted to the government has been discussed previously herein
under the question of when a false statement comes "within"
the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. Suffice it to say
that it is not necessary that the false statement be submitted
by a defendant to the Government. 6 It is necessary, however,
that the false statement be made "in intended relationship"
to governmental matters8 7 and that there be some guarantee that
it will eventually be received by the government.8
IV. OTHmR DmsEsS
A. The Overlap of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 with Other
Similar Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 1001 is not the only federal statute dealing with
false statements. There are various other statutes applicable
to the same offense which are, however, normally limited to a
particular area of federal activity. Defendants prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 frequently argue that the government should
more properly proceed under a false statement statute dealing
specifically with the particular offense. In United States v.
Rayo'r,8 9 faced with such an argument, the court concluded that
it was not the taxpayer's privilege to say that the government
should have proceeded under a statutory provision other than the
one it chose. Expanding the argument further, some defendants
85. E.g., Fisher v. United States, 254 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1958) ; DeCasaus
v. United States, 250 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1957); Fisher v. United States, 231
F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1956).
86. Ebeling v. United States, 248 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1957).
87. Lowe v. United States, 141 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1944).
88. Cf. Terry v. United States, 131 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1942).
89. 204 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
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have said that the enactment of a more specific statute in the
same area impliedly repeals 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in that area. In
Cohe4n the court dismissed that argument with this language:
[Tihe broad false statement provisions of [18 U.S.C.
§ 1001] have their place as a "fitting complement" to
other statutes dealing with false statements in particu-
lar fields. . . . A number of . .. cases illustrate that
specific legislation will not be held to have re-
pealed by implication more general legislation in this
field where another reasonable construction can be
applied. 0°
The court further stated that, although similar, the statutes
were actually designed to accomplish different purposes.
In United States v. Beacon Brass Co.,91 defendant was charged
with attempting to evade taxes under a section of the Internal
Revenue Code. Since the gist of the offense was a false state-
ment, the defendant argued that he should have been prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which at the time of the prosecution
was barred by its statute of limitations. The defendant argued
that since Section 1001 dealt specifically with false statements
while the other statute dealt generally with attempts to evade
taxes, prosecution could only proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
The court affirmed the conviction and said:
We do not believe that Congress intended to require the
tax enforcement authorities to deal differently with
false statements than with other methods of tax eva-
sion. By providing that the sanctions of § 145(b)
should be 'in addition to other penalties provided by
law,' Congress recognized that some methods of at-
tempting to evade taxes would violate other statutes
as well.92
In United States v. Heine,93 the defendant was convicted for
making false statements under a presidential proclamation re-
quiring all aliens to apply for a certificate of identification. He
appealed on the grounds that the proclamation and accompany-
ing regulation contained their own punishment, namely, deten-
90. 201 F.2d at 392-93.
91. 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
92. Id. at 46.
93. 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1945).
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tion, internment, etc. The court, however, affirmed the convic-
tion holding: "Thus it [18 U.S.C. § 1001] prescribes an over-all
penalty for falsification, no matter what other penalties the
statutes or regulations in connection with which the falsification
occurs may dictate."9 4 It is thus clear that a defendant has no
right to choose the statute under which he is prosecuted, and
has no right to complain if another statute exists which is more
specific.
B. GovernmentaZ Implementation of an UneonstitutionaZ
Statute.
As stated previously, it is not a defense to a prosecution under
18 .S.C. § 1001 that the governmental operations in which the
false statements were made were in fact vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack.95 The number of cases supporting this proposi-
tion clearly indicate that it is settled law.
V. SUMMARY
This summary will state the prevailing rule regarding the
purpose of the statute, its elements, those matters which are not
elements, and other defenses to prosecutions under the statute.
The purpose of the statute is to protect the authorized func-
tions of governmental departments and agencies. The state-
ments contemplated by the statute are both oral and written,
and according to the general rule, must be material; although
those circuit courts which require materiality define it in
accordance with the expressed statutory purpose. An "excul-
patory no", if limited to no more than that, in the investigatory
field, may not be a "statement" within the meaning of the
statute. The prohibited statement must be false, and it must
be wilfully made. There is some dispute as to whether wilful
means with evil intent; but where used in conjunction with the
term "knowingly" as in "knowingly and wilfully," if it has any
meaning separate from knowingly, then it must mean with evil
intent. With respect to when a matter is within the jurisdic-
tion, dealing specifically with jurisdiction, the Fiedman case
has raised a definitional problem which would restrict the ap-
plication of the statute. The Fiedman case appears to be in
the minority at this time and it is presently to be doubted that
94. Id. at 487.
95. United States v. Kapp, 302 U.S. 214 (1937); Ogden v. United States,
303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1962) ; cf. Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938).
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jurisdictions other than the Eighth Circuit require that for a
matter to be within the jurisdiction of an agency, the agency
must have the power to make monetary award, grant govern-
mental privileges, etc. To come "within" the jurisdiction, the
false statement does not have to be submitted directly to the
Government; but it must be made "in intended relationship"
to a governmental matter and must inexorably find its way into
governmental hands, for the offense to be complete. The terms
"9agency" or "department" are broadly defined and cover the
three branches of Government and their subordinate agencies
and departments. With respect to those matters which are not
elements, it is not necessary that the false statement relate to a
pecuniary fraud, nor be made under oath, nor be required by
law, nor be corroborated by two witnesses, nor be directly sub-
mitted to the Government, nor be relied upon by the Govern-
ment. With respect to other defenses, it is irrelevant that 18
U.S.C. § 1001 overlaps with other statutes, and it makes no
difference whether or not the statute under which the Govern-
ment was proceeding was unconstitutional at the time that the
false statement was made.
VI. A CoNcLusioN
The fifth amendment prohibits the state from requiring per-
sons to speak if speaking would thereby incriminate them. All
that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires is that when a person does speak
to the state, he must speak the truth. His alternatives therefore
are either to speak truthfully or to say nothing. Since his
silence is protected, the consequences of his misrepresentations
are of his own making.
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